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FOR RELEASE
PM
THURSDAY, June 23, 1960

Statement of Senator Mike Mansfield (D -Montanct)

NEW INSIGHTS -NEW POLICIES
Something has gone wrong.

That much, at least, is clear from

the recent rapid succession of visible crises.

First, there was the U -2 incident

then the summitt-collapse and the withdrawal of the invitation to the President
to travel to Russia and, most recently, the forced cancellation of the President 1 f
visit to Japan.
Recent events, particularly, in Japan are a source of regret and
concern.

But we shall only intensify the difficulties by a hostile and intemper-

ate reaction.

Japan is going through an hour of great trial.

We can best serve

the cause of peace and our joint interests by exercising patience and restraint
at this time.

It is not for us to judge in anger and to talk of boycotts and

retaliation unless we seek to propel the Japanese nation in the direction of the
Soviet orbit.

It is for us to try to preserve the decent and cooperative relations

which were born after the bitterness and exhaustion of World War II.

It would

be well for us to remember that Japan is critical to freedom and peace in the
Far East.

Unless its ties with this country are maintained the positions in

Korea and Okinawa lose much of their meaning and the security of the entire
Far East will be endangered.
In any event, little is to be gained at this time by angry

-2speculati("'n on what has gone wrong elsewhere either in Japan or in the Soviet
Union~

As for what has gone wrong in our own house,

that~

our business.

It is the business of the President, the Senate, and the Congress.

It is the

business of the people of the United States.

!~~ to~nd~r:s;~n~ w~;; ~aos:st~~~~. ;v~or;gJ-:"%~, h=av.,:_g2!__,!_~go
back to the ~t where the difficulty first became apparent.
Mr. President, is the U-2 incident.
incident, honestly and bluntly.

That P"int,

We have got to face the facts of that

We have got to face them before they fade

into the obscurity of time.
I have in ' eP t ionally reserv e d t his comment until the President
had returned from the Orient and the CQmmittee on Foreign Relations had
completed its inquiry into the U-2 affair.
try to put the incident into perspective.

But it is appropriate, now, to
Enough facts for that purpose are

now public information.
It is possible to draw reasonable C 1'~nclusions C'n the U-2 affair

in terms of our national security and welfare, but it is not easy or painless
to do so.

The incident occurred in connection with Soviet Ras sla and is,

therefore, heavily charged with emotion~

A natural tendency exists to describe

the affair in the best possible light, to see its consequences in the most
optimistic fashio!l,

Moreover, delicate

queAt~ons

naticnal security are interwoven with the affair.
what we say against possible

H.lsintcJ.-pr~tatioJl.

of national unity and

We are compelled to measure
And, finally, Mr .. President,

-3the facts of the incident which occurred in May have more and more become
eonfused with the fancies of November.
So, I repeat, Mr. President, it is neither easy nor painless to
draw reasnnable conclusions on this incident.
the

effort~

Nevertheless, we ml!st make

As responsible officials, we owe that much t 3 the people whom we

represent.
the incident.

We owe it to the people whose lives and fortunes were cast into
We must make the effort in order to gaJn new national insights.

We must make the effort in order to recast both ottr policies and thei:::- adminw
istration for the greater sec'..lrity and welfare l'lf tl:e nation.
I speak for myself and only for myself, as one Member of the
Senate of the United States, in making these remarks.

I should like to

emphasi z e that the remarks are based solely on the public record, as it is
to be found in various 0fficial statements, in the reports <'f the press, radio
and TV and in the published hearings of the Committee

rm FC1lrei gn Relations.

There is more than er.::mgh information in this public record
to reach reasonable conclusions,

The American press and other communica-

tions facilities have performed an exceptional public service in connect~.on
with the coverage of the U-2 incident,

In these past few weeks, we have

seen and hea:rQAmerican journalism in breadth, in depth, and at its best.
I should also like to commend the able Senator frcm Arkansas
(Mr. Fulbr:lght) for his contributions to our understanding 0£ the U -2 affa:!.r.
was
His chairmanship of the inquiry into the incident,
exemplary in every
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way.

Without jeopardizing security or unity, he saw to it in accord with the

Administration, that adequate and dispassionate information on these proceedings was made public.
Irrelevant Questions
Mr. President, it has seemed to me that our principal responsibility, as Senators, has been to try to understand the facts of the U- 2 incident
in the hope that out of the experience might come new and better ideas as to
how to proceed more effectively in the future.

I assume that atl Senators, all

officials, who are discus sing this matter in public forums have had similar
purposes in mind.
For that reason, Mr. President, I should like to deal first with
what I believe are three extraneous questions which have been insinuated into
the debate and discussion,

If we permit ourselves to be side-tracked into

matters such as these, we shall gain little of use to the nation from the
experience despite the great price that has been paid for it.
Irrelevant Cuestions:

Why the S ummit collapsed?

The first is the question of why the 5ummit collapsed.

Since

responsible officials of this government have stated for the record that they
expected little from the meeting long before it was torpedoed, then I can see
little relevance in the question of who fired the tube.

Indeed, if we are to go

into su::h conjectural matters, we might find it far more profitable to ask why
we agreed to go to the meeting in the first place.

Why, indeed, should

-5we have participated, if, U -2 or net, the Summit was gning to be of so
little value 7
For my part, I am prepared tC' accept what is apparently the
thesis of this Administration that Mr,

Khrushchev~

dealt the

cot~p

de grace

to what was destined to be, in any event, a somewhat fruitless meeting.
One might, I suppose, on tr.e basis of this thesis, commend Mr, Kt.rushchev
for saving the American taxpayers a good deal of money.

For conferences

ef this kind are most costly, involving as they do, the travel expenses and
pay of a large delegation ('.f officials; and the costs pile up, the hmger they
remain, uselessly, in session.

Irrelevant Question: Shculd we have apologized?
The seccnd quest:.on which I regard as irrelevant to the discussion
is whether we should have apologized to the Soviet Union in Paris,
that nations from time to time infrir..ge the rights of ether r..ations.
they apC'logize for these infringements and even pay damages.

It is true
Svmetimes

Sametimes

they denr the infringements or, at any rate, do n'"t apol('.gize for them.
a nation, we are not an exception.

We have done b0th.

As

On occasicm, we have

ignored the complaints of others and on occasion we have apa>l0gized.
Oddly enough,
question

durin~

this Administration, long before the

was posed after the events in Paris, I believe we h3.d already

apolngized to the s._,viet Uni("n for an infringement.

Oddly enough, it was

an infringement which grew out of the flight of an American plane.

I read

-6to the Senate, infull, adispatchintheNewYorkTimes, Februrary2,

1958, page 25:

"U. S, Apologizes on Jet F'light"
"BERLIN, Feb. 1 (AP) --The United States ha.s
apologized to the Soviet Union because a United States
Air Force jet made an accidental flight over East
German territory Thursday. A United ~tates
mission spokesman said the apology had been made
in an o1·al exchange between the Soviet and United
States members of the Air Safety Center, the Big
Four body that controls air traffic to Berlin. 11
So, Mr. President, when the question is asked should we have
apologized or expressed regrets let no one associated with this Administ:r.ation
throw up his hands in horror at the mere thought.

This Administration,

apparently, has already a-eologized to the Soviet Union and to other nations
for infringements of one kind or another and notably for plane flights.
It so happens, Mr. President, that I agree with the attitude
which Mr. Eisenhower took in not apologizing to Mr. Khrushchev.

I agree

with it, in the light of the circumstances which prevailed at that time.

I

agreE' with it on the basis of the manner and place in which the demand was
made.

I agree with it on the basis of the publicly-known facts.

If the

intrusion of the U- 2 had been an accident- -if it had been an oversight
rather than an overflight--then, indeed, an apology or an expression of
regret immediately after the incident had occurred might have been in order.
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But these circumstances did not prevail.

The explanations

given out after the incident emphasized that neither an accident nor an
oversight was involved.

Further, the explanations indicated that we were

pursuing some fixed policy in these fLights, based upon national and freeworld necessity.

Finally, the world-wide impression was created and

allowed to stand until the Paris meeting, that these flights would be continued.
To have apologized in these circumstances would have bad no meaning.
could have served only to subject us to the world-wide ridicule,
I

agree~

It 1

Therefore,

on the basis of the known facts, with the President's decision not

to apologize.
It is possible, of course, that all the facts have not been
made public.

It is conceivable that on the basis of all the facts, another

course might have been indicated.

After all the Administration had a

precedent, as noted in the New York Times dispatch that I have just quoted.
It may be that there is still a feeling of doubt in the minds of some that we
did take the right course. It may be this doubt which prompts some to
continue to raise this question, this question of whether or not we should
have apologized in Paris.

If that is the case, then, I suggest those who

are still perJ?lexed should address the question to the Administration.
But if the question is addressed to the American people or to the candidates
for the Presidency, it has no relevance to an understanding of the U -2
incident.

By obscuring the facts of the incident,. it will inhibit the nation

from understanding the incident and profiting from it,

-8Extraneous Question:

Do we want another Pearl Harbor?

The third extraneous question, Mr. President, is v.he ther
or not we want a nether Pearl Harbor.

This question has something in common

with one which is asked in a !amous play.
question from their childhood.

Most Senators will remember the

The question is asked by Peter Pan, as Tinker

Be.ll, the devoted but errant pixie lies desperately ill, its light flickering
dimly.

Peter Pan addresses the audience and asks whether or not they

wish Tinker Belt to die.

The response cff the audience, through generations

of children, has invariably been a resounding "no".
In the san•e fashion, Mr. President, I cannot conceive of
any American in his right senses answering anything other than "no" to the
question of whether or not we want another Pearl Harbor.

But since this

question has been raised, I am sure, not with any desire to appeal to an
audience, but out of a deep concern for the

security of the nation, I shall

take the time of the Senate to analyze it.
lf the question is going to have more relevance to our

underotanding of the U -2 incident then Peter Pan 1s, it is necessary to
determine what is inferred by it.

After all, it is two decades since Pearl

Harbor.

·....

IJ·a-s·s-ume·,

thereltJ!•e~ i~Jhal.t ~the

inference of the question is that the U -2 flight-program was vital in
preventing a catastrophic military attack on the security of this nation.

-9Secretary of Defense Gates, indeed, seems to have used the worU "vital" to
describe the kind of information which the flights were producing.

Importance of the U -2 Program and the Ill-fated U -2 Flight
I am most anxious, Mr. President, that President Eisenhower
decide and do what is "vital" for the security of this natio;1.

I have tried in

the past, at all times, to give him my full support in such decisions and
actions.

It is his primary responsibility.

National unity requires that he

be supported in exercising this responsibility in vital matters.
All we may reasonably ask is tha t the President in fact does
decide and that he does watch closely every aspect of these vital decisions.
If the U -2 flights were "vital 11 to prevent another Pearl Harbor then they

should have be e n ma d e.

But, equally, they should have been made under the

continuous scrutiny of the President and the coordh1ated scrutiny of Members
of his Cabinet.
The facts in the public record show clearly, however, that
while politically-responsbile officials knew genera.lly of this program of
U -2ovefflightA they did not subject them to continuous and coordinated

scrutiny,

The facts indicate that the control and timing of them was in the

hands of various obscure employees of the bureaucracy.

It is quite clear

that Mr. Eisenhower did not push any button to set the particular ill-fat.ed
U-2 flight in motion, nor did Mr. Gates, nor Mr. Herter.
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Since that is the case, Mr. President, we must question either the
degree of attention which these officials were paying to their duties in vital
matters or we must conclude that it is misleading to create the impression
that these flights, in themselves, were vital.
knows, means essential to life.
and the Members of his Cabinet.
bilities.

The word, vital, as the Senate

I have the highest respect for the President
I am sure none was negligent in his responsi-

I can only assume, therefore, that while the flights were important,

they were not regarded as really so important as to command the continuing
attention of the politically-responsible officials of the Administration.

I can

only conclude that the word "vital" is too strong to use in describing their
importance.
That such may be the case is indicated by the suspension of the flights
by the President and his assurance to Mr. Khrushchev that they would not be
resumed.

Obviously, if they were vital to prevent another Pearl Harbor

attack upon our security the President would never have made that decision.
The fact is, Mr. President, that the security of this nation, any
nation, in this uncertain and dangerous world is safeguarded not by any single
factor but by many fact('rs.

These factors of security fall into two general

categories: (1) foreign policies, which should act to reduce the dangers and
uncertainties which confront us abroa<;; and (2) the total capacity of the nation
for defense. These categories include far more than intelligence -operations
and far- -far more than any single intelligence operation such as the U -2
program.

Our security depends on the morale and determination

of the nation.

~f

the people

It depends on the attitudes of peoples in the Communist nations
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as, for example, whether or not they are militant

in their hostility to us

or whether, persuaded that we intend them no harm, the militancy is tempered
It includes the state of trust and confidence which exists between ourselve.s
and friendly peoples.

Particularly, it includes the attitudes of those nations

which stand firm and independent in their I")Wn right, but nevertheless are
allied with us against common dangers.

It includes the efficiency of our

Defense Establishment, its weapr.ms and it9 state of readiness. lt includes
~ur scientific creativity and our technical ingenuity.
It includes-this base upon which our security stands--all these elements and many others.
It is in terms of all these elements that any reasonable

evalua~

of the U -2 program and the ill-fated flight in particular must be made, not
in terms of the spectre of a Pearl Harbor attack two decades a.go.

Even as

an intelligence-operation, without regard for the other factors on which our
security depends, we muot weigh the risks and cost of the U-2 flights against
the availability from other sources of the kind of informat;on which they produced.

In this connecti~n, I would point out that much has been made of the

fact that the U -2 flights obtained data on the location of Russian missile
sites, submarine bases and nuclear

center~;.

That is clearly information

of a most significant nature for the defense of the nation.

But to illustrate

that there are sources of information other than U -2 reconnaisance flights,
even on such significant matters, even in countries which made a fetish of
secrecy, I call to the attention of the Senate an article from the magazine
" Missiles and Rockets." In an issue, published early this year, it lists and
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pin-points on a rna? ten Soviet I. C . B. M. sites_ nnd 30 I. R. B. M. aites which
were

hc~ted

from pubJic sources in

:S~rope

and from techni ';al jonrnals.

I ask unanimous cunsent that this article appea:::- at the conclusion of my re marks.
I also cc.ll to the attenticn of the Senate an article by Sarrison
Salir>bury in the Ncvr Y01k Times, Sept.:.mber 30, 1954. and an article in
the

''Bullet~n

of

th~

Atomi;:: Scientists" (October l9S9) 'cy ArncJ.d Kranish.

These articles reveal c. e a t deal about certain Soviet ;uum:.c centers and
contain information on them

w~ich

no aerial

phc~ograph

could possibly supply.

I ask unanimous cor.ser.t that both articles be printed at the co!l.clusion of my
remarks.

I also

re~er

the Senate to the fuller treatment of this subject as it

appec:.r3 in a book by Mr. Kranish entitled "Atomic Energy in the Sl"lviet
Union" (Stanford Univernity Press, 1959).
I call to the attention o£ '.:he Senate the

ref~rence

work, "Jane's

Fighti!'g Ships (1950-1960)," wh!.c':l lists, with photogra:nr.s, submarines of
the Soviet

N<~·ry.

Finallv, I refer the

S~nate

to the boolc "The Soviet Navy"

edit eel by Commander M. G. Saunc1er s of the United Kingdom (Frederick A.
Praeger, 1958) .

On pages 161-163 there is a detailed table of the location

and capacity of shipyards throughout the Soviet Union, specializing in naval
work .

I ask unanimous consent that the table referred to be included in the

record at the conclusion of my remarks and I strcngly recommend to those
whose work may require a more detailed picture of the Soviet navy this book
edited by Commander Saunders.
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I do not \Vish to leave the imEE_ession, Mr. President, that I believe
these and eimilar oublications are the equivalent in militrtry value of the
aerial films of Rusoia produced by the U -2 program.

So far as I know, in

sorne respects, they may be more complete, more valuable and in others less
complete, less valuable.

All I am trying to suggest., Mr. President, is that

while obviously we cannot ignore the importance cf secret intelligenceoperations, we muet recognize equally that they are not always the cnly
~

source

and .they are not nece s5arily

always the best source of information.

They are a part of or should be a part

o£ a total pattern of defense which takes

in~o

consideration all aspects cf

foreign and defe:n.se policy.
I cannot bring myGeH to believe that

anyon~

who raises the question,

do we wa::1t another Pearl Harbor, seriously wishe o to leave with this Senate
or the people ci tl:.e United States the impression that the C. I. A. and, in
particular, one aeria.l-recoimaisance operation of the agency, alone, stands
between us and

8.

:repetition of that catastrophe.

Cost of the U -2

Fli~

On the basis of the public record we can assume that these flights

produced information--probably very impo!'tant information--for certain
aspects of our military defense.

On the basis of tke public record, we know

that they produced this information at an enormous price.

And it is only in

an information to cost ratio that they can be properly evaluated.

I am talking,
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now, not of the monetary cost of the flights, which were undoubtedly high, but
of the full cost, in terms of damage to the total pattern of the foreign and defense policies by which we seek to safeguard our security.

It is difficult to

estimate that coat, Mr. President, if for no other reason than that all the
bills have probably not yet beea submitted.

On May 9th, as the facts of the

U -2 incident began to clarify, I stated in the Senate:
"The President has been undercut on the eve of a major
international conference at a moment of world crisis.
The world-wide adverce repercussio;:'ls for the foreign
policy of :he United States have only begun but they will
be heard loudly and ominously from Norway to Japan."
If we cannot measure the cost of this flight in any specific fashion,

we can, nevertheless, gain some indication of it by observing the events
which have transpired in the nation and in the world since May 1, less than
two months ago.

Let me stress that there are many factors which explain

each of the developments which I am about to list.

Nevertheless, I know'"Of

no serious evaluation of the pre sent international situation which would ingore
the U -2 incident as one of the factors in each of them.
(1) The colJ apse of the Summit whose value only the Administration
can estimate since it was responsible for pl4rsuing it.
(2) The intensification of anti-American sentiment, the cancellation
of the President's visit, and the cprouting of seeds of deep opposition in Japan
to the Japanese- United States security treaty.
(3) The shock at home arrl in many friendly nations at the confirmation of the fact that we were engaged in activities which, theretofore, many
tended to associate almost wholly with Snviet behavior.
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(4) The embarrassment of certain nations allied with us, around the
periphery of the Soviet Union and, in consequence, the inetitutio_n by them
of more stringent control over the use of their def.ense facilities by the United
States~

(5) The intensification of the threat of war by accident or miscalcula:
tion growing out of the order to Soviet military authorities to rocket the bases
in surrounding nations from which unauthorized planes might intrude and the
restatement of our determination to fulfill our defense

cor~'lmitments

to these

nat.ions.
(6) The strengthening of the hand r:Jf hard-line communists within the
Soviet Union and the communist bloc, notably the Chinese communists, against
those in Communi£t countries who might believe it possible to live at least
without

~nilitary

conflict, if not i.n harmony with us, on this globe grown so

small.
(7) The partial resumption of the tactics of the cold war, thereby
renderir.g more difficult all efforts to deal with international problems by
rational negotiation.
(8) The intensification of pressure on the Congress for

increas~d

foreign aid appropriations, notably military aid, and increased defense spending in the light of the increased tensions flowing fro:::n the U -Z incident.

Origins of the Ill-fated U -2 Flight
It is all very well for Mr. Eisenhower to assume personal responsibility for this coatly program of overflights which contributed in greater or
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lesser degree to all of these devel0pments.

In an ultimate sense, he is

responsible for everything tha.t transpires in our relations with other nations.
It would not be in keeping wit!-1 his character to shi:::-k that responsibility.
Nevertheless, it is clear from the public record, as I have already noted,
that not a single Member of the Cabinet nor the President exercised any
direct control

wh~tsoever

at which it was launched.

over the ill-fated U-2 flight at the critical moment
It ought to be made clear that this particular flight

was apparently set in motion on the basis of a law passed in 1947, an executive order issued about 7 years ago and by what, apparently, was a routine
clearance some weeks before the flight itEelf.

If we can draw any conclusion

from the public record itis that this particular flight owes its origin more to
bureaucratic inertia, lack of coordination and control and insensitivity to its
potential cost than it does to any conscious decision of politically-responsible
leadership.

Lack of Fixed Responsibility and Coordination
That conclusion is reinforced by the confusion which surrounded the
release of official explanations of the flight.

At least three Departments or

agencies --Defense, State and N.A. S. A., without adequate and continuing consultation- -one with the other- -contributed Eltatements by way of explanation.
Add to that the comments emanating from the White House.
C. I. A. --prompting from behind the scenes.

Add to that, the

Add to that, the words of the Vice

President who, stepping into the matter at the 11th hour, tried to rescue the situation with speeches in New York.
Mr. President, we do not have to wait for Mr. Khrushchev to ask the
question.

We need to ask it ) ourselves:

Who runs this Administration in the

vital matters of foreign policy and defense?
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It is not a new

gu~stion.

The shocking disarray of departments,

agencies and sub-agencies through which this nation tries to conduct the foreign
relations and defense of the nation, at best, borders on a national disgrace and,
at worst, courts national disaster.
In a speech in the Senate during the closing days of the last
session (September 4, 1959), the problem was alluded to in these terms and,
I shall quote at length from my remarks at that time because they apply most
directly to the U -2 incident:
" •••• ,We-- not others-- deterrnine for what purpose
we have a ~tate Department, an aid-administration, a
E:entral Intelligence Agency, an Information Eervice and
a host of other agencies which carry on activiti.e s abroad
on the basis of appropriations from public funds and on
behalf of the entire n a tion. We alone decide how they shall
function.
"When I use the term 'we, 1 I mean, of course, the
people of the United Ctates, In mattGrs of foreign
relations, however, the responsibility for interpreting
what we want and how we are to pursue it rests, in a
theoretical sense, with the elected President, acting
in some instances with the advice and consent of the
elected Senate and in others with the concurrence of
the elected Congress,
"That is the Constitutional theory, Mr. President,
but what is the fact?
The fact is that the power to
interpret the will of the nation in respect to our vast
and complicated relations with the rest of the world has
been diffused through the enormous labyrinth
of the Executive Branch of the government. The power to
decide, in short, has been scattered and diluted to the point
where it has become virtually impossible to use the public
power effectively to bring about adjustments in policy and
its administration at somewhere near the time that these
adjustments are needed.

-18"In these circumstances, natio·n al interests frequently
become so interwoven with bureaucratic interests
and conflicts that we are less and less abte to adjust
the total needs of the nation to the changing circumstances
of the world,
More and rr..ore we have a policy determined
by Executivt! agency accommodation a-nd less and less by the
leadership and decision of the responsible political officials
of the Administration and the Congress.
"I realize that this problem has been with the
nation for a long time, It is not amenable to easy solutione
Nevertheless, Mr. President, we must deal with it, if
responsible government in the field of foreign policy is
not to degenerate into a cat ch-phrase, We must stay with
this problem- -the President and the Congre3s- -until it
yields to rational solution."
And, I repeat now, almost a year later that, indeed, we must stay
with this problem until it yields to rational solution,

That, in my opinion,

is the most significant conclusion which can be drawn from the U -2 incident.
In short, the most pres sing need of this government i s a more effective, a
more responsible and responsive system of administration of its foreign
relations and its

defense.

And, at the same time, in the wake of the collapse

of the summit we ne e d to get straiaht, once and for all, that personal
magneti.sum and the personal contacts of heads of states are not a substitute
for polici e s continually attuned to the e ver-changing realities of the world.
I reach this conclusio:1 notwithstanding the President's, and Vice President's
continued endorsement of summit conferences and personal diplomacy as
reported in the N e w York Times (Ju ne 18, 1960) by Harrison Salisbury and
the Washington 8 tar (June 19, 1960) by David ':; , Broder.

I ask unanimous

-19consent that these reports from the Times, and the Star be printed at the
conclusion of my remarks.
The basic questions remain: Can we develop a more responsive, more
reponsible administrative system?

Can we devise the new policies which

are essential and keep them adjusted to ever -changing realities?
I am firmly convinced that, to, do so, is in the "vital" interest of the
freedom of this nation.

May I say that I use the word "vital" here advisedly,

with full awareness of its literal meaning.

In this connection, I wish to note

the outstanding contribution that is already being made by the special committee
under the Chairmanship of the distinguished Senator from Washington (Mr.
Jackson) on the question of administration.
As the Senate knows, over the years, I have made suggestions- -as one
Senator, along with other members of this body- -both with regard to policy
made have
and its administration. Sometimes suggestions which I have I entered into
policy, in whole or part, and often they have not.
to be constructive in the past,

In any event, I have tried

That is my intention, today, in setting forth

additional and specific proposals on our policies and their administration,
The needed changes cannot be brought about by glittering generalities,
All of us desire a durable peace,

All of us wish to

saf~guard

the nation,

All

of us seek more efficient, effective and responsible administration of the
nation's foreign and defense affairs.
these generalities.

The problem is not to state and restate

The problem now, is to set forth specifics which may act

to bring us closer to these desired ends,
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I am persuaded that the problem is primarily one of new ideas and of
action on ideas.
istration.

We need ideas on how to improve our policies and their admin-

We need ideas set forth now; ideas to be amended;

ideas to be

adopted or rejected; but as of this moment, above all, ideas to be discussed.
I believe the thoughts which I am about to express contain some promise
of a more effective, efficient and responsible administration of our international
affairs and our defense.

I believe they may help to lead us to a more rational

and secure position in the world than the position of quicksand on which we now
stand,

The Senate may f ind that they do not hold any such '(llll"Omise.

Neverthe-

less, we must begin in earnest on this problem in its specifics and I shall
present these thoughts, as a beginning, for wha tever they may be worth.

Possible Administrative Chang es

The first set of sug gestions which I lay befor e the Sena te, Mr.
President, deal with administrat ive changes in the c onduct of foreign relations
and aspe cts of defe n se.

The y a re prompted by e1e U -2 incident and its

handline but they repre sent many years of study, experience apd observation
of the ope ratio n of th is gove rnment.

I present the s ugg e stions, at this time,

in outline form, su fficient only to indicate the channels in which improvement
might be sought.
(1)

Considera tion should be given to the di s solution of the National

Security Council sta ff structure and the transfer of the functions of that body
to the regular cabinet departments of the Executive Branch.
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(2)

The importance of the Cabinet as the principaL source of advice to

the President should be re.ass erted,

Within the Cabinet, an Inner Council con-

sisting of the Secretary of State and Secretary of Defense under the Chairmanship of the President should meet on a continuing basis on all matters of
critical importance to the peace and security of the nation.
(3)

The function of the Vice-President should be confined to that

defined in the Constitution which is to preside over the Senate and to such
ceremonial functions as the President, with the concurrence of the Senate
leadership, may aseign from time to time to the office.
(4)

The independent status of all agencies with predominantly inter-

national functions- -in particular, the linternational Cooperation Administration
and the United States Information Service should be terminated promptly.
The functions of these agencies and personnel should be fully incorporated
into the Department of State, with due recognition of the contribution which
the employees of these agencies have made and with due
right to fair treatment.

regard to their

Any large-scale reductions in personnel which

these mergers may entail should be brought about, primarily, through normal
attrition and special adjustments in the retirement system, with personnel in
the Department of 3tate and in the agencies, considered on the basis of equality..!.
(5)

Full control over all international policies and activities of agencies

with predominantly domestic functions, such as the Atomic Energy Commission,
the Department of Agriculture, the Department of Defense and the Department

of Commerce should be lodged with the Department of =: tate.
(6)

A drastic reduction in the major decision-making and, hence,

decision-delaying personnel should be made in the hierarchy of the Department
of Defense and in the three services and in the Department of State,
(7}

Justification before the Congress of the military budget and the

division of appropriations as among the services should be the exclusive
responsibility of the Secretary of Defense and the civilian Secretaries of each
service.

As a general practice, our highest military officers should be

permitted to concentrate on the problems of military defense and should not
be involved in the politics of budgeting or the process of appropriations.
(8)

The functions of the C. I. A. in the gathering of nonclandestine

intelligence information sbould be integrated into already existing intelligence
branches of tl:e Department of Defense and the Department of State in order
to limit what, at present, appears to be a great duplication of effort.

Further,

intelligence-gathering operations by the Department of Defense , should be
confined to military matters and, by the Department of State to non-military
matters.

Finally, a select committee of the two Departments should be

established to evaluate and advise the President and the Inner Cabinet Council
on all intelligence matters.

C. I. A. personnel who may be affected by this
equality
change should be treated on the same basis of fairness and
as already

noted in connection with the proposed integration of the U.S. I. s. and the I. C. A.
into the Department of State.
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established on the pattern of the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy and should
be kept as fully apprised as possible in relation to the national

int~rest,

of any

rerraining functions of the C. I. A.
(10}

The c· ecretary of State should be assigned responsibility by the

President for estab!ishing and enforcing policies on public speeches and public
pronouncements of

~ll

officials- -military and civilian- -of the Executive Branch

which deal with que s tions involving our relations with other nations.

Atrl, in

gene ral, all Executi ve Branch personnel outside of the Department of State
should a void public remarks in tJli.ese matters.
(H)

The entire Committee-structure within the Department of Defense

and the Department of State and among the Departments and Agencies of the
Executive Branch, involved in foreign and defense affairs, should be reviewed
from top to bottom, by a Presidential-Congressional Commission with a view
to a drastic reduction in their

numbers.
Proposals in Policy

Let me outline next, Mr. President, certain suggestions relative to
the content of foreign policies.

These changes are required now more than

ever, for the bubble r:>f peace by public relations has burst and we need, •
promptly, to fill the void with new policies for peace.

I shall confine my

comments, today, to those aspects of policy which I believe to be most

.. .•:

critical, the most urgent.

If I do not make mention of the foreign aid program

in these suggestions, it is because my views on this matter are well-known.
They are to be found in detail in a report issued this year by a Foreign
Relations Subcommittee on the Aid-Program in Viet Nam, many of the
conclusions of which have a far wider applicability than to that one nation.

My

views are also expressed in speeches to the £enate last year and in amendments
offered at that time to the aid-bill.

l.

Overflights
The A merican A mb a ssador in Moscow shonld be instructed to invite

consultations with his c olleagues from those nations on the periphery of the
Soviet Union and with officials of the S ovie t foreign offi c e with a view to clarifying the implications of the order to the Sovi et military forces to rocket the
bases from which planes may intrude into the Soviet Union.

The need is to

eliminate, at on c e, the possibility of a sudden ignition of massive nuclear
conflict, by accident or inadvertence.

This possibility is dangerously inherent

in the Soviet military order and our response to it.

By the same token we

should clarify our own position on plane s which may intrude, by accident or
inadvertence, into the air-space of the Unite d States.
This question is the most pressing matter facing the nations of the
world today.

Some international a g reement on a n accepted procedure for

dealing with accidental ove rflights is essential and it is urgent.

Until the

-25fingers are removed from the hair-triggers, we are not justified in assuming
that a single human being in this country, in Russia or anywhere in the world
has a minimum degree of
destruction.

...·ational security against sudden, inadvertent

This problem, of border intrusions, is part and parcel of the

whole question of surprise attack,

If we can conceive of any greater or more

futile disaster to mankind than a deliberate attack which ignited a nuclear war
it would be an accidental and

2,

unn~cessary~tack

which ignited a nuclear war,

Disarmament and Nuclear Testing
It should be recognized by all co-.H:erned that there are not now and

there are not likely to be any absolute, 100% guarantees of fullproof inspection
of anything.

Similarly, it should be recognized that total disarmament down

to the level of sticks and stones in the circumstances in which the world finds
itsel.f is a fantasy.

Therefore, the conferences on disarmament and nuclear

testing should either be abandoned or the positions

of all nations concerned

in these matters should be revised, so that they are no longer wedded to
absolutes that cannot, rationally, be met.

If there is to be any approach which

offers hope of progress in this field,. it must be one of weighing the risks of
rational

inspection coupled with the beginnings of international disarmament,

on one hand, against the consequences of an uninterrupted, an intensifying and
a spreading armament competition on the other and this approach must be
accepted by all the participants,
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3,

Berlin
Our policy

s~1ot::.ld

go beyond a mere holding cf Wect Berlin and,

apparently, a willi_ngness to make concessions by limiting weapons and men
in that half -city.

Our p -:., licy Ghou ld embrace and advocate the

neutr:tlizatio~

and internationalizat ion of all of Berlin--both Soviet and Western zones-on an interim oasis, until it is once again the capital of a unified Germany.
To that end we should seek, through diplomatic negotiations, United Nations
control and polic i ng of the er.tire city and routes of access, with the cost of
the undertaking borne by the governments of bot h J:-arts of Germany in
appropriate shar es .

4,

Far East
Congress "''n u.ld, in the next ses si.on, consider a substitute or a re-

vision of the Formosa resolntion of 1955 which w ould:

(a) Alter the status

of this resolution from an A ct cf Law into a resolution of Congressional
advice to

t~e

President,

v1it h o u~

forc e of law ; and (b) make clear that, as

far as Cong ressiona l ad vi ce in this m a.t t er is c oncerned, it applies only to_
the def e nse of Formosa and the Pesc eldore s by Americiin miJ.itc..ry forces.
One condition should be attached to this clarification.

It is that the Chinese

Communists shaH not seek to hamper the peac eful adjustment of the military pos itions of the Chinese Na.tion a.l g o vernment outside Formosa and the
Pescadores, positions which it may have been led to take on the assumption
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that

th~

American commitment extended beyond these islands.

I should like

to note that this is not a new view but one which I have he!d since this resolution was first considered.
tions and vagueness.

I had doubts then about its constitut ional implica-

I still ente!"tain the same doubts.

I should like, also,

to call to the attention of the Senate the views of the President en this matter
a8 he expresssed them in Formosa and tc that end ask un.animous consent to
include at the conclusion of my remarks an article by Harrison Salisbury
in the New Yo•k Ti.rnes, June 19, 1960.

5.

We should begin no\·.r, in diplomatic exploration,

to seek to channel cur

efforts in space exploration into a joint program with the other N. A. T. 0.
members.

Our objective should be to marshall the full scientific and

technical talents d the West and to spread the enormous costs of this
enterprise.

Ultimately, the world should act as a unit in the universe

but the time to begin to mcve towards that goal is now and the logical
place for us to begin is in concert with the NATO nations.

6.

China and Soviet Russian-Chinese Relations
Windows of contact and legitimate first -hand observations should

be ope n e d on devel opments in China 2-r.d alon& one of the most critical
borders in the world, the Soviet and Chinese convergence in Outer Mo:1golia
in Central Asia.

To that end, the possibilities of an exchange of missions

with the government Qf Outer Mongolia should be seriously explored,

A
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renewal of efforts for the exchange of newsmen with China on a quid pro quo
basis should be undertaken.

A revision of trade restrictions with the Chinese

mainland to bring them into line with those which apply to the Soviet Union
should be considered.

May I say, parenthetically, that these suggestions

do not imply recognition by this country of Communist China.

To the best

of my knowledge we have never offered it nor have they sought it and there
is nothing to indicate its desirability or even its possibility at this time.

7.

Middle East
The Congres G should cone:ider a revision or substitute for the

Eisenhower resolution on the Midd.l e Eact which would:

(a) Alter the

present legal Btatl.!e of the resolution as an act of law to that of a resolution
of Congressional advice to the President; and (b) make clea-.:' that, within the
over-all purpose of seeking to help nations in that region defend themselves
against communism, our policieG are now based squarely on the foHowing
premises:
(1) Stabilizatior:. of existing frontiers, except as they may be altered
by peaceful agreement;
(2) Dissolutil'n of the refugee problem by the joint principle of repatriation, as practicable, and just compensation;
(3) Full freedom of passage o£ Suez now and a gradual reduction of the
other practices of economic warfare in the area;
(4) Full support of the use of U.N. emergency forces for the safeguard
of the borders of any nation which fears for its security, with all U.N. membe :
bearing

reaso~able

portions of the cost of such operations;
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Internationalization of the Holy Places in Jerusaleum;

{6)

Efforts to control and reduce the flow of armaments to all

nations of the Middle East, coupled with international guarantees of support
to any nation which may be victimized by an act of aggression.
These principles are close to those which are contained or irr.plied in
our present policies,

They favor neither Arab nor Israeli.

They favor those

who mean it when they talk of peace and are prepared to begin now to work
for it.

The important need is to spell out these principles, by a vigorous

adherence to them not only in official public statements, but in diplomacy, in
aid-activities and in all other aspects of the conduct of our politices in the
Middle East.
8.

Cuba
Governor Munoz -Marin, an outstanding citizen of this nation as well

as Puerto Rico, one o£ the most respected leaders of the Western Hemisphere,
should be requested to undertake a mission to Havana.

If he is able to assume

this responsibility, he should engage in frank discussions with Premier Castro
and submit in private or public, as he deems desirable, his analysis of the
present deplorable state of Cuban-American relations and his recommendations
as to what may be done to improve them,
9.

Personal Diplomacy a.nd Summits
A moratorium should be declared on official visiting and conferences

of Heads of the States, (particularly as this practice may involve nations with
which we have major problems at issue.

This moratorium should last at

least until it is clear that specific problems have been pre -negotiated to the
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brink of ag!"eement, Further, we need to conserve the strength and time of
the Secretary of State and, to that end, a greater use of ambassadors,
adequately instructed is clearly indicated.

Concluding Comments
As I have already noted, Mr. President, the thoughts which I have
expressed today touch, not upon all, but only upon the most in1mediate and
the most pressing questions which col"'..front us in our foreign relations.
Nevertheless, I have set f orth these· thoughts, not without trepidat:.on, not
without a sense of my own inadequacies but, withal, with a recognition of
my great responsibilities as a Senator of the United States.
For the matters with which I have dealt in these remarks are those
in which no man can aspire to certain knowledge.

They are matters of

paramount importance to jpeople of the United States.

They are matt era

which, when taken together, not only relate to the kind of life we shall have
in this decade but m a tters which may well be critical in determining
whether there shall be a recognizable civilized life, at all, for ourselves
and for much of the human race.
Against this monumental background, questions of how soft or how
tough we are intalking to the Russians or to any other people have little
relevance to our survival or welfare.

H ow wise we are and how dedicated

we may be to the interest s d the nation and to fr e edom, b e yond all personal
concern, are central to the problem which confronts us.
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A looming shadow is on the nation and en the world; a shadow cast
by serious questions, too long deferred; a shadow cast by serious thought
too long evaded.

It is for this President and the next, Democrat or Republi-

can, and fCl" the Congress t o r e cognize this shadow, to define its dimensions
and to act to lift it.

It must be lifted.

It can be lifted.

cl us, begin in earnest the work of lifting it.

Let us, now, all

